Much has been written about recidivist punishments, particularly within the area of criminology. However there is a notorious lack of penal philosophical reflection on this issue. This book attempts to fill that gap by presenting the philosopher’s view on this matter as a way of furthering the debate on recidivist punishments.

ABSTRACTThe most publicised rebellion during the so-called ‘Shareholder Spring’ of 2012 was at Barclays PLC. Using multi-modal and critical discourse analysis, this paper examines how three UK television channels with different public service obligations covered this story on 27 April 2012. It finds that broadcasters’ regulatory obligations do not obviously impact content and that, for example, simple reporting routines contain judgemental phrases. Generally, the multi-dimensional nature of executive pay is simplified and the real balance between private and individual shareholders is (...) obscured. Analysis also reveals that editing and the use of images can subtly construct discourses that may not reflect the reality of the dissent. The paper concludes that established criticisms that business journalism is indolent and that corporate discourses are privileged are not supported, but also that the coverage contributes little to promote wider understanding of executive pay debates. (shrink)

It is now five years since P. J. Parsons published the Lille Callimachus, and the dust appears to have settled. The appearance of these fragments, which greatly increase our knowledge of the opening of the third book of the Aetia, has been followed by no great critical reaction. Apart from the attractive suggestion of E. Livrea that the ‘Mousetrap’ may belong within the story of Heracles and Molorchus, the episode has had somewhat limited impact. This is against the usual trend (...) of over-reaction to the publication of new literary texts , and is in part a tribute to the thoroughness and clarity with which Parsons presented the fragments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Latin Literature. A HistoryRichard F. ThomasGian Biagio Conte. Latin Literature. A History. Translated by Joseph B. Solodow. Revised by Don Fowler and Glenn W. Most. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. xxxiii 1 827 pp. $65.00.The work under review is a translation of Gian Biagio Conte’s 1987 book Letteratura latina; Manuale storico dalle origini alla fine dell’ impero, a book whose title page acknowledged the (...) collaboration of Alessandro Barchiesi, Emanuele Narducci, Giovanni Polara, Giuliano Ranucci, and Gianpiero Rosati. In the translation these scholars have been moved into C.’s “Acknowledgements,” making room for the new group on the title page, as given above. Of these, Don Fowler provided a bibliography and “in a sense has helped to direct the whole editorial enterprise,” while Glenn Most (like Solodow, one of C.’s English translators), rewrote sections on reception. Elaine Fantham introduces the work with an encomiastic “blurb” and general appreciation of the scholarship of C. C.’s own preface adds to the “gang of five” original collaborators a new group of three (Mario Labate, Alessandro Schiesaro, Rolando Ferri) who “have freely given me the support of their attentive and considerate criticism.” One recent reviewer talks of “the thorough control of the material by the single mind of the original author” (Robert P. Sonkowsky, The Key Reporter 61.3 [1996] 13), as does another for whom “the book is the production of a single mind” (J. Griffin, “The Long Latin Line,” review in New York Review of Books [Oct. 6, 1994] 43); it therefore seems only right to register my dissent from such a judgment.Much in Latin studies right now seems to involve a pack mentality: teams toil away for their grex, writing encomiastic and disingenuously uncritical reviews, or footnotes acknowledging the help of other teammates, attending conferences, organizing group-solidifying essay collections, even new series and manifestoes promising a “New Latin”—a term that seems to have no particular theoretical or intellectual content, nor a purpose other than to appeal vaguely for some sort of postmodernist approval. Barbara F. McManus’ summary of a paper on the uses of e-mail for mobilizing interest groups, delivered at a conference on computers and the classics by the very editor of the book under review, Don Fowler (“The Scroll and the Screen: Computers and Classical Literary Criticism”), gives a clear account of procedure and techniques in use:Electronic communication allows small groups with strongly related interests to form, cohere, and influence the larger disciplinary community; because such groups start with fundamental agreement on intellectual frameworks and approaches, they can develop ideas rapidly and in depth.(2/8/97 )What happens when other, less organized and more individual, insights fail to coincide with the “fundamental agreement” of the “group,” and how, we might wonder, will such individualism hold up in the face of this mission to “influence the larger disciplinary community”? [End Page 471]Be all this as it may and whatever the realities of authorship, the achievement of Gian Biagio Conte’s volume is a signal one. Latin Literature is a work of considerable value, a work which I have already used with success in teaching the history of Latin literature. Whatever the state of its authorship, I would now move to a review of some of its merits, which are considerable, and in which C. himself is obviously a participant throughout. The book begins with the origins of Latin literature and extends to Bede and the national literatures that were to transmit Latin literature into the vernaculars, that would in turn connect the essential themes and fundamental concerns of classical Latin literature to the cognate and evolving experiences of later antiquity and the middle ages. The original authors worked to a formulaic scheme: generally “Life,” “Works,” some treatment of cultural/political/social context, “Literary Success” (for the Italian “Fortuna”—I would have preferred “Reception”), and bibliography. This latter, again by Fowler, is developed from the Italian version and is generally made more international, often with the result that it sits somewhat uneasily with the original articles, which are largely unchanged, and whose authors presumably made... (shrink)

The text of this poem, already corrupt in the Palatine, has had a turbulent history over the last two centuries. Here is Page's version, the translation in Gow–Page, and my own somewhat expanded apparatus: I who in time past was good for five or nine times, now, Aphrodite, hardly manage once from early night to sunrise. The thing itself, – already often only at half-strength, – is gradually dying. That's the last straw. Old age, old age, what will you do (...) later when you come to me, if even now I am as languid as this. (shrink)

Among other things, R. O. A. M. Lyne's recent edition and commentary of the Ciris has established the general method of composition followed by this pseudo-neoteric poet: he demonstrably lifted wholesale and applied to his own poem words, phrases, lines, and even entire sequences from the works of the neoterics and the poets of the following generation. Accordingly, one of the poem's chief attributes is that it serves as a means for recovering the general content, and at times the actual (...) wording, of earlier, more important poetry. This paper offers some additional areas in the Ciris where such influence may exist. I confine myself to Cinna and Calvus, whose poetry may justly be considered the missing two-thirds of the neoteric movement. (shrink)

Introduction: The Anarchist -- The Minister: 1756-93 -- The Philosopher: 1793 -- The Activist: 1794-95 -- The Husband: 1796-99 -- The Educator: 1800-09 -- The Father:1810-19 -- The Pensioner:1819-36 -- The Legacy.

Inviting readers to ponder this genre's various manifestations since the late 1700s, this collection of probing essays allows fans and philosophy buffs alike to ...

Sports referees are not always as unbiased or impartial as they ideally should be. Studies have shown, for example, that in their decisions, referees seem to be biased against people of different r...

Little is known about the psychological processes that can explain how connectedness to nature evolves. From social psychology, we know that emotions play an essential role when connecting to others. In this article, we argue that social connectedness and connectedness to nature are underpinned by the same emotions. More specifically, we propose that social relational emotions are crucial to understanding the process, how humans connect to nature. Beside other emotions, kama muta (Sanskrit: being moved by love) might play a particular (...) crucial role when connecting to nature. Future research should address the consideration of social relational emotions in a range of areas when investigating the human-nature relationship. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to provide a systematic reconstruction and critique of what is taken to be a central ethical concern against the use of non-medical egg freezing. The concern can be captured in what we can call the individualisation argument. The argument states, very roughly, that women should not use NMEF as it is an individualistic and morally problematic solution to the social problems that women face, for instance, in the labour market. Instead of allowing or expecting (...) women to deal with them on an individual level, we should address them by challenging the patriarchal structures of the labour market—for example, by securing equal pay, or paid maternal leave, or ‘paid paternal [partner] leave and sick leave and affordable child care’. It will be made clear that there are several versions of this argument. The author will try to elaborate this claim, and it will be explained that the differences depend on the way in which bioethicists believe that individuals use of NMEF is morally problematic, compared with the alternative of securing social change for women in, say, the labour market. Finally, a critical discussion of three versions of the individualisation argument will follow, and it will be shown why all versions are on rather thin ice, or in other words, that they are implausible. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically discuss the plausibility of legal moralism with an emphasis on some central and recent versions. First, this paper puts forward and defends the thesis that recently developed varieties of legal moralism promoted by Robert P. George, John Kekes and Michael Moore are more plausible than Lord Devlin's traditional account. The main argument for this thesis is that in its more modern versions legal moralism is immune to some of the forceful challenges made (...) to Devlin by Hart, Dworkin and Feinberg among others. Second, however, the paper challenges the new generation of legal moralists and suggests some areas for further development. Although Devlin's position has been scrutinized thoroughly in the literature on the philosophy of law, there has, to my knowledge, been no comparable, systematic critique of these different proponents of legal moralism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Axiology of Environmental Ethics Normative Theories and Environmental Ethics.

An argument against the use of non-medical egg freezing is that women should not use NMEF as it is an individualistic and morally problematic answer to the social problems that women face, for instance, in the labour market. Instead of allowing or expecting women to deal with these problems individually, we should address them by challenging the patriarchal structure of the labour market—for example, by securing equal pay and affordable childcare. In a recent article in Journal of Medical Ethics, I (...) argue that we should distinguish between different versions of this kind of reasoning and that all the versions discussed are implausible.1 In three separate comments following my article in the March 2021 issue of JME, Moen,2 Segers3 and Campo-Engelstein4 have supported and criticised some of my results. It is impossible, in such a short reply, to discuss all of their many relevant comments in detail, but in what follows I will reply to some of their criticism. Moen presents several interesting comments; let me try to deal with what I take to be the two most important ones. The first of these deals with some of my critical comments concerning …. (shrink)

The paper critically discusses a role-model argument (RMA) in favour of banning performance-enhancing drugs in sport. The argument concludes that athletes should be banned from using performance-enhancing drugs because if they are allowed to use such drugs they will encourage, or cause, youngsters who look up to them to use drugs in a way that would be harmful. In Section 2 the structure of the argument and some versions of it are presented. In Section 3 a critical discussion of RMA (...) is presented. It is argued that we should be reluctant to accept the argument as it stands for at least three reasons: (i) it rests on an unsupported empirical claim; (ii) it also makes a false empirical claim; and (iii) the normative premise of the argument is too demanding morally. Further objections to the RMA are also discussed, but argued to be beside the point. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present and critically investigate a type of argument against legalising assisted dying on request (ADR) for patients who are terminally ill and experiencing suffering. This type of argument has several variants. These—which we call ‘autonomy-based arguments’ against legalising ADR—invoke different specifications of the premise that we ought not to respect requests for assistance in dying made by terminally ill and suffering patients because the basic conditions of autonomy cannot be met in scenarios where (...) such requests are made. Specifically, it is argued either (1) that as a result of pain, anxiety or desperation, terminally ill patients are not competent decision makers or (2) that legalisation of ADR would lead to social pressure or in other ways change the patient's context of choice in ways that make such requests nonautonomous. We argue that these types of arguments are problematic in light both of empirical studies and the fact that we usually judge that it is morally right to respect the wishes and decisions of dying people even if they suffer. (shrink)

The articles in this volume showcase the potential richness of frame representations. The presentation includes introductory articles on the application of frames to linguistics and philosophy of science, offering readers the tools to conduct the interdisciplinary investigation of concepts that frames allow. * Introductory articles on the application of frames to linguistics and philosophy of science * Frame analysis of changes in scientific concepts * Event frames and lexical decomposition * Properties, frame attributes and adjectives * Frames in concept composition (...) * Nominal concept types and determination "This volume deals with frame representations and their relations to concept types in linguistics and philosophy of science. It aims at reviving concepts and frames as a common model across disciplines for representing semantic and conceptual knowledge. Departing from the general assumption that frames are not just an arbitrary format of representation but essential to human cognition, a number of case studies apply frames as an analytical tool to a wide range of phenomena, from changes in scientific concepts to particular linguistic phenomena. This provides new insights into long-standing semantic issues, such as the lexical representation of verbs (as predicative frames specifying particular event descriptions or situation types and their participants), adjectives and nominals (as concept frames, which provide attributes and properties of an entity), as well as modification, complementation, possessive constructions, compounding, nominal concept types, determination, or definiteness marking." Bert Gehrke, Pompeu, Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 1, Page 42-48, January 2022.

The aim of this article is to present and critically discuss a gametheory- based argument in favour of the view that sports organizations ought to ban the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport. After presenting the argument in detail, I try to show that the argument is not convincing. First, the argument cannot be used to argue in favour of WADA’s (World Anti-Doping Agency) current ban on doping, at least if it rests on the assumption, that doping use is always (...) harmful. However, that in itself may not be a problem for adherents of the argument, and they can and should modify the harm assumption to cover only harmful use of doping. Second, even with this modification, it is argued that the harm assumption is flawed, for example, because it is not obvious why we should accept certain harms in sport but not harm to athletes caused by doping. Third, the argument is also flawed because it entails the non-competitive assumption: if all athletes dope, then no competitive advantages are gained by any athletes assumptions. The noncompetitive assumption is challenged in view of the observations that doping can have some non-competitive advantages and is, so to speak, not only a positional good and because doping, due to unequal responsiveness, can give some highly responsive athletes a competitive advantage over less responsive athletes. (shrink)

Most of us want to have children. We want them to be healthy and have a good start in life. One way to achieve this goal is to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis . PGD enables people engaged in the process of in vitro fertilisation to acquire information about the genetic constitution of an early embryo. On the basis of this information, a decision can be made to transfer embryos without genetic defects to the uterus and terminate those with genetic defects.1However, (...) is it morally acceptable to use PGD to reduce the probability of children with severe genetic diseases being born? Is the current routine use of PGD in public healthcare services to select against severe genetic diseases like anencephaly, spina bifida, cystic fibrosis and Down’s syndrome morally acceptable?These are complex questions involving a range of difficult ethical issues—for instance, critical discussions about the morality of embryo research and embryo termination.2 They also involve awkward conceptual issues concerning such matters as the meaning of words such as “disability”3 and “severe” in “severe genetic diseases”,4 which will not be discussed here.In this paper I examine an argument which aims to show that efforts to prevent the birth of severely disabled children using PGD are morally unacceptable. Essentially, this argument appeals to our concern for disabled people and the belief that PGD, through a slippery slope process, will have bad consequences for them. I conclude that the argument is problematic for a number of reasons. But before I examine the argument itself, it will be helpful to separate two types of slippery slope argument since these involve different kinds of reasoning.TWO TYPES OF ARGUMENTMany of the arguments against PGD point to the bad consequences it can be expected to have for disabled people. Central to all these …. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 6, June 2022.

This paper critically discusses an argument that is sometimes pressed into service in the ethical debate about the use of assisted reproduction. The argument runs roughly as follows: we should prevent women from using assisted reproduction techniques, because women who want to use the technology have been socially coerced into desiring children - and indeed have thereby been harmed by the patriarchal society in which they live. I call this the argument from coercion. Having clarified this argument, I conclude that (...) although it addresses important issues, it is highly problematic for the following reasons. First, if women are being coerced to desire to use AR, we should eradicate the coercive elements in pro-natalist ideology, not access to AR. Second, the argument seems to have the absurd implication that we should prevent all woman, whether fertile or not, to try to have children. Third, it seems probable that women's welfare will be greater if we let well informed and decision-competent women decide for themselves whether they want to use AR. (shrink)

Employers’ access to and use of criminal records as a selection mechanism in the labor market makes it far more difficult for ex-offenders to find jobs, especially regular, well-paid jobs, than those without criminal convictions. The paper asks whether there is anything morally problematic about this practice. The aims of the paper are twofold. First, arguments based on premises of wrongful discrimination against the current, commonest use of criminal records are critically discussed. It is argued that employers do not necessarily (...) engage in morally wrongful discrimination against job applicants when they use criminal records in recruitment screening. But it is also argued that ex-offenders who apply for jobs are subject to what can be called “structural and morally wrongful discrimination” when laws allow employers to request (or directly access) a job applicant’s full criminal record. Second, preliminary proposals on how criminal records can be used by employers in a way that avoids wrongful structural discrimination of ex-offenders will be presented and critically assessed. I suggest that it should be lawful for an employer to access an applicant’s criminal records only where there is a relevant and special match or link between the crime on the records and the job being applied for and the crime is serious. This proposal is defended against two objections, one based on concerns about crime prevention and the other based on the employer’s interest in knowing whom not to hire. (shrink)

Thomas Berry presents his vision of cosmology and the relationships in creation. Responses from Donald Senior, Gregory Baum, Margaret Brennan, Stephen Dunn, James Farris, and Brian Swimme round out the insights and create magnetic reading.

In this article several justifications of what I call ‘the claim from adoption’ are examined. The claim from adoption is that, instead of expending resources on bringing new children into the world using reproductive technology and then caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children.Arguments trading on the idea that resources should be directed to adoption instead of assisted reproduction because already existing people can benefit from such a use (...) of resources whereas we cannot benefit individuals by bringing them into existence are rejected. It is then argued that a utilitarian argument proposed by Christian Munthe that supports the claim from adoption in some situations should be rejected because the support it offers does not extend to certain situations in which it seems morally obvious that resources should be expended on adoption rather than assisted reproduction. A version of the Priority View improves upon Munthe’s utilitarianism by supporting the claim from adoption in the cases in which Munthe’s argument failed. Some allegedly counterintuitive implications of the Priority View are then discussed, and it is concluded that the Priority View is more plausible than utilitarianism.n a concluding section on policy issues it is argued that, even though the claim from adoption can be justified in a variety of situations, it does not follow that, in these situations, governments should direct resources away from assisted reproduction and towards adoption. (shrink)

In a recent JME article, Joona Räsänen makes the case for allowing legal age change. We identify three problems with his argument and, on that basis, propose an improved version thereof. Unfortunately, even the improved argument is vulnerable to the objection that chronological age is a better proxy for justice in health than both legal and what we shall call official age.

The 2018 eligibility regulation for female competitors with differences of sexual development (DSD) issued by World Athletics requires competitors with DSD with blood testosterone levels at or above 5 nmol/L and sufficient androgen sensitivity to be excluded from competition in certain events unless they reduce the level of testosterone in their blood. This paper formalises and then critically assesses the fairness-based argument offered in support of this regulation by the federation. It argues that it is unclear how the biological advantage (...) singled out by the regulation as an appropriate target for diminishment, is relevantly different from other biological advantages that athletes may enjoy, and specifically that Sigmund Loland’s recent attempt to drive a wedge between heightened levels of blood testosterone and other biological advantages fails. The paper also suggests that even if heightened blood testosterone levels do differ relevantly from other types of biological advantage, the regulation is further challenged by studies indicating that athletes with blood testosterone at the high end of the normal range have a competitive advantage over athletes with blood testosterone levels at the low end of it. Finally, the paper contends that the premises of the fairness-based argument do not unequivocally support the conclusion that DSD athletes with heightened levels of testosterone should diminish those levels, since, just as powerfully, they support allowing athletes with normal levels of testosterone to use performance-enhancing drugs in the name of fairness. (shrink)

In this article, our aim is to show why increasing the effectiveness of detecting doping fraud in sport by the use of artificial intelligence (AI) may be morally wrong. The first argument in favour of this conclusion is that using AI to make a non-ideal antidoping policy even more effective can be morally wrong. Whether the increased effectiveness is morally wrong depends on whether you believe that the current antidoping system administrated by the World Anti-Doping Agency is already morally wrong. (...) The second argument is based on the possibility of scenarios in which a more effective AI system may be morally worse than a less effective but non-AI system. We cannot, of course, conclude that the increased effectiveness of doping detection is always morally wrong. But our point is that whether the introduction of AI to increase detection of doping fraud is a moral improvement depends on the moral plausibility of the current system and the distribution of harm that will follow from false positive and false negative errors. (shrink)